Given the demonization of the psychedelic drug LSD, it may seem inconceivable that
mainstream , psychiatrists were giving it to patients during sessions. Yet for at least 20 years,
that's exactly what happened.
Created in 1938, LSD was first suggested as a tool in psychotherapy in 1949. The following year
saw the first studies in medical/psychiatric journals. By 1970, hundreds of articles on the uses of
LSD in therapy had appeared in the Journal of the American Medical Association, the Journal of
Psychology, the Archives of General Psychiatry, the Quarterly Journal of Studies of Alcoholism,
many non-English-language journals, and elsewhere.
Psychiatric and psychotherapeutic conferences had segments devoted to LSD, and two
professional organizations were formed for this specialty, one in Europe and the other in North
America. International symposia were held in Princeton, London, Amsterdam, and other
locations. From 1950 to 1965, LSD was given in conjunction with therapy to an estimated
40,000 people worldwide.
In his definitive book on the subject, LSD Psychotherapy, transpersonal psychotherapist
Stanislav Grof, MD, explains what makes LSD such a good aid to headshrinking:
...LSD and other psychedelics function more or less as nonspecific catalysts and amplifiers
of the psyche.... In the dosages used in human experimentation, the classical psychedelics,
such as LSD, psilocybin, and mescaline, do not have any specific pharmacological effects.
They increase the energetic niveau in the psyche and the body which leads to manifestation
of otherwise latent psychological processes.
The content and nature of the experiences that these substances induce are thus not
artificial products of their pharmacological interaction with the brain ("toxic psychoses"),
but authentic expressions of the psyche revealing its functioning on levels not ordinarily
available for observation and study. A person who has taken LSD does not have an "LSD
experience," but takes a journey into deep recesses of his or her own psyche.
When used as a tool during full-scale therapy, Grof says, "the potential of LSD seems to be
extraordinary and unique. The ability of LSD to deepen, intensify and accelerate the
psychotherapeutic process is incomparably greater than that of any other drug used as an adjunct
to psychotherapy, with the exception perhaps of some other members of the psychedelic group."
Due to bad trips experienced by casual users, not to mention anti-drug hysteria in general, LSD
was outlawed in the US in 1970. The Drug Enforcement Agency declares: "Scientific study of
LSD ceased circa 1980 as research funding declined."
What the DEA fails to mention is that medical and psychiatric research is currently happening,
albeit quietly. Few researchers have the resources and patience to jump through the umpteen
hoops required to test psychedelics on people, but a few experiments using LSD, ecstasy, DMT,
ketamine, peyote, and other such substances are happening in North America and Europe.
Universities engaged in this research include Harvard, Duke, Johns Hopkins, University College
London, and the University of Zurich.
We're presently in the dark ages of such research, but at least the light hasn't gone out entirely.
Friday, December 29, 2006
The Bayer Company Made Heroin
Aspirin isn't the only "wonder drug that works wonders" that Bayer made. The German
pharmaceutical giant also introduced heroin to the world.
The company was looking for a cough suppressant that didn't
have problematic side effects, mainly addiction, like morphine
and codeine. And if it could relieve pain better than morphine,
that was a welcome bonus.
When one of Bayer's chemists approached the head of the
pharmacological lab with ASA — to be sold under the name
"aspirin" — he was waved away. The boss was more interested
in something else the chemists had cooked up — diacetyl-
morphine. (This narcotic had been created in 1874 by a British
chemist, who had never done anything with it.)
Using the tradename "Heroin" — because early testers said it
made them feel heroisch (heroic) — Bayer sold this popular
drug by the truckload starting in 1898. Free samples were sent
to thousands of doctors; studies appeared in medical journals.
The Sunday Times of London noted: "By 1899, Bayer was
producing about a ton of heroin a year, and exporting the drug
to 23 countries," including the US. Medicines containing
smack were available over-the-counter at drug stores, just as aspirin is today. The American
Medical Association gave heroin its stamp of approval in 1907.
But reports of addiction, which had already started appearing in 1899, turned into a torrent after
several years. Bayer had wisely released aspirin the year after heroin, and this new non-addictive
painkiller and anti-inflammatory was well on its way to becoming the most popular drug ever. In
1913, Bayer got out of the heroin business.
Not that the company has kept its nose clean since then:
A division of the pharmaceutical company Bayer sold millions of dollars of blood-clotting
medicine for hemophiliacs — medicine that carried a high risk of transmitting AIDS — to
Asia and Latin America in the mid-1980s while selling a new, safer product in the West,
according to documents obtained by The New York Times.... [I]n Hong Kong and Taiwan
alone, more than 100 hemophiliacs got HIV after using Cutter's old medicine, according to
records and interviews. Many have since died.
pharmaceutical giant also introduced heroin to the world.
The company was looking for a cough suppressant that didn't
have problematic side effects, mainly addiction, like morphine
and codeine. And if it could relieve pain better than morphine,
that was a welcome bonus.
When one of Bayer's chemists approached the head of the
pharmacological lab with ASA — to be sold under the name
"aspirin" — he was waved away. The boss was more interested
in something else the chemists had cooked up — diacetyl-
morphine. (This narcotic had been created in 1874 by a British
chemist, who had never done anything with it.)
Using the tradename "Heroin" — because early testers said it
made them feel heroisch (heroic) — Bayer sold this popular
drug by the truckload starting in 1898. Free samples were sent
to thousands of doctors; studies appeared in medical journals.
The Sunday Times of London noted: "By 1899, Bayer was
producing about a ton of heroin a year, and exporting the drug
to 23 countries," including the US. Medicines containing
smack were available over-the-counter at drug stores, just as aspirin is today. The American
Medical Association gave heroin its stamp of approval in 1907.
But reports of addiction, which had already started appearing in 1899, turned into a torrent after
several years. Bayer had wisely released aspirin the year after heroin, and this new non-addictive
painkiller and anti-inflammatory was well on its way to becoming the most popular drug ever. In
1913, Bayer got out of the heroin business.
Not that the company has kept its nose clean since then:
A division of the pharmaceutical company Bayer sold millions of dollars of blood-clotting
medicine for hemophiliacs — medicine that carried a high risk of transmitting AIDS — to
Asia and Latin America in the mid-1980s while selling a new, safer product in the West,
according to documents obtained by The New York Times.... [I]n Hong Kong and Taiwan
alone, more than 100 hemophiliacs got HIV after using Cutter's old medicine, according to
records and interviews. Many have since died.
An FBI Expert Testified That Lie Detectors Are Worthless for Security Screening
Now let's turn our attention to the last member of our trifecta of defective tests — the polygraph,
more commonly referred to as the lie detector. Invented by the same person who created Wonder
Woman and her golden lasso that makes you tell the truth (I'm not kidding), the polygraph is said
to detect deception based on subtle bodily signals, such as pulse rate and sweatiness. Its
proponents like to claim that it has a success rate of 90 percent or more. This is pure hogwash.
While the evidence against lie detectors is way too voluminous to get into here, it will be very
instructive to look at a statement from Dr. Drew Richardson. Richardson is a scientist who was
an FBI agent for 25 years; in the late 1980s and early 1990s, he dealt with polygraphs.
In fall 1997, a Senate Judiciary subcommittee held hearings regarding the FBI Crime Lab.
Richardson gave scorching testimony about polygraphs. Referring specifically to the practice of
using lie detectors to question people in sensitive positions, he said under oath:
It is completely without any theoretical foundation and has absolutely no validity. Although
there is disagreement amongst scientists about the use of polygraph testing in criminal
matters, there is almost universal agreement that polygraph screening is completely invalid
and should be stopped. As one of my colleagues frequently says, the diagnostic value of this
type of testing is no more than that of astrology or tea-leaf reading.
If this test had any validity (which it does not), both my own experience, and published
scientific research has proven, that anyone can be taught to beat this type of polygraph
exam in a few minutes.
Because of the nature of this type of examination, it would normally be expected to produce
large numbers of false positive results (falsely accusing an examinee of lying about some
issue). As a result of the great consequences of doing this with large numbers of law
enforcement and intelligence community officers, the test has now been manipulated to
reduce false positive results, but consequently has no power to detect deception in
espionage and other national security matters. Thus, I believe that there is virtually no
probability of catching a spy with the use of polygraph screening techniques. I think a
careful exam-ination of the Aldrich Ames case will reveal that any shortcomings in the use
of the polygraph were not simply errors on the part of the polygraph examiners involved,
and would not have been eliminated if FBI instead of CIA polygraphers had conducted
these examinations. Instead I believe this is largely a reflection of the complete lack of
validity of this methodology. To the extent that we place any confidence in the results of
polygraph screening, and as a consequence shortchange traditional security vetting
techniques, I think our national security is severely jeopardized.
After he ripped polygraphs a new one, the FBI silenced Richardson, refusing to let him speak
publicly about the subject again.
more commonly referred to as the lie detector. Invented by the same person who created Wonder
Woman and her golden lasso that makes you tell the truth (I'm not kidding), the polygraph is said
to detect deception based on subtle bodily signals, such as pulse rate and sweatiness. Its
proponents like to claim that it has a success rate of 90 percent or more. This is pure hogwash.
While the evidence against lie detectors is way too voluminous to get into here, it will be very
instructive to look at a statement from Dr. Drew Richardson. Richardson is a scientist who was
an FBI agent for 25 years; in the late 1980s and early 1990s, he dealt with polygraphs.
In fall 1997, a Senate Judiciary subcommittee held hearings regarding the FBI Crime Lab.
Richardson gave scorching testimony about polygraphs. Referring specifically to the practice of
using lie detectors to question people in sensitive positions, he said under oath:
It is completely without any theoretical foundation and has absolutely no validity. Although
there is disagreement amongst scientists about the use of polygraph testing in criminal
matters, there is almost universal agreement that polygraph screening is completely invalid
and should be stopped. As one of my colleagues frequently says, the diagnostic value of this
type of testing is no more than that of astrology or tea-leaf reading.
If this test had any validity (which it does not), both my own experience, and published
scientific research has proven, that anyone can be taught to beat this type of polygraph
exam in a few minutes.
Because of the nature of this type of examination, it would normally be expected to produce
large numbers of false positive results (falsely accusing an examinee of lying about some
issue). As a result of the great consequences of doing this with large numbers of law
enforcement and intelligence community officers, the test has now been manipulated to
reduce false positive results, but consequently has no power to detect deception in
espionage and other national security matters. Thus, I believe that there is virtually no
probability of catching a spy with the use of polygraph screening techniques. I think a
careful exam-ination of the Aldrich Ames case will reveal that any shortcomings in the use
of the polygraph were not simply errors on the part of the polygraph examiners involved,
and would not have been eliminated if FBI instead of CIA polygraphers had conducted
these examinations. Instead I believe this is largely a reflection of the complete lack of
validity of this methodology. To the extent that we place any confidence in the results of
polygraph screening, and as a consequence shortchange traditional security vetting
techniques, I think our national security is severely jeopardized.
After he ripped polygraphs a new one, the FBI silenced Richardson, refusing to let him speak
publicly about the subject again.
DNA Matching Is Not Infallible
Speaking of tests that aren't all they're cracked up to be, let's look at DNA testing. This is
supposed to be the absolute silver bullet of criminal justice, an incontrovertible way to pin guilt
on someone. After all, the chances of a mismatch are one in a billion, a quadrillion, a jillion!
Some experts have testified under oath that a false match is literally impossible.
Not quite. As he did with HIV testing, risk scholar Gerd Gigerenzer of the Max Planck Institute
punches a hole in the matching of genetic material:
In the first blind test reported in the literature, three major commercial laboratories were
each sent 50 DNA samples. Two of the three declared one false match; in a second test one
year later, one of the same three laboratories declared a false match. From external tests
conducted by the California Association of I Crime Laboratory Directors, the
Collaborative Testing Services, and other agencies, the psychologist Jonathan Koehler and
his colleagues estimated the false positive rate of DNA fingerprinting to be on the order of 1
in 100. Cellmark Diagnostics, one of the laboratories that found matches between O.J.
Simpson's DNA and DNA extracted from a recovered blood stain at the murder scene,
reported its own false positive rate to the Simpson defense as roughly 1 in 200.
It gets even worse. In 1999, the College of American Pathologists performed its own secret tests
of 135 labs. Each lab was sent a DNA sample from the "victim," some semen from the "suspect,"
and a fake vaginal swab containing DNA from both parties. They were also sent a strand of the
"victim's" hair. The object was to see how many of the labs would make the matches (ie, match
the two sperm samples of the man, and match the hair and DNA sample of the woman). But
something unexpected happened: Three of the labs reported that the DNA from the suspect
matched the victim's DNA! Obviously, they had mixed up the samples. Only fourteen labs tested
the hair, but out of those, one screwed it up by declaring a match to the "suspect."
These kind of switches don't happen only during artificial situations designed to gauge a lab's
accuracy (which are usually performed under ideal conditions). During a 1995 rape trial, a lab
reversed the labels on the DNA samples from the victim and the defendant. Their testing then
revealed a match between the defendant's alleged DNA (which was actually the victim's) and the
DNA on the vaginal swab, which didn't contain any semen from the rapist. Luckily, this
boneheaded move was caught during the trial, but not everyone is so lucky.
The Journal of Forensic Science has reported an error that was discovered only after an innocent
man had been convicted of raping an 11-year-old girl and sentenced to prison, where lie was
undoubtedly brutalized in ways that would give you nightmares for the rest of your life, were
you to hear them described in detail. After four years, he was released because the lab hadn't
completely separated the real rapist's DNA (extracted from his semen) from the victim's DNA.
When the two were swirled together, they somehow matched that of the poor bastard whose
eleven alibi witnesses failed to sway the jury. But when the semen DNA was checked properly, it
was beyond doubt that a match didn't exist.
While most false matches are the result of human error, other factors do come into play. Some
testing techniques are more definitive than others. In the case of one innocent man — Josiah
Sutton, found guilty of rape based primarily on DNA evidence — criminology professor William
C. Thompson said: "If police picked any two black men off the street, the chances that one of
them would have a DNA profile that 'matched' the semen sample as well as Sutton's profile is
better than one in eight." Also, we mustn't forget about corruption. In some known cases, DNA
analysts have misrepresented (ie, lied about) their findings in order to obtain convictions.
supposed to be the absolute silver bullet of criminal justice, an incontrovertible way to pin guilt
on someone. After all, the chances of a mismatch are one in a billion, a quadrillion, a jillion!
Some experts have testified under oath that a false match is literally impossible.
Not quite. As he did with HIV testing, risk scholar Gerd Gigerenzer of the Max Planck Institute
punches a hole in the matching of genetic material:
In the first blind test reported in the literature, three major commercial laboratories were
each sent 50 DNA samples. Two of the three declared one false match; in a second test one
year later, one of the same three laboratories declared a false match. From external tests
conducted by the California Association of I Crime Laboratory Directors, the
Collaborative Testing Services, and other agencies, the psychologist Jonathan Koehler and
his colleagues estimated the false positive rate of DNA fingerprinting to be on the order of 1
in 100. Cellmark Diagnostics, one of the laboratories that found matches between O.J.
Simpson's DNA and DNA extracted from a recovered blood stain at the murder scene,
reported its own false positive rate to the Simpson defense as roughly 1 in 200.
It gets even worse. In 1999, the College of American Pathologists performed its own secret tests
of 135 labs. Each lab was sent a DNA sample from the "victim," some semen from the "suspect,"
and a fake vaginal swab containing DNA from both parties. They were also sent a strand of the
"victim's" hair. The object was to see how many of the labs would make the matches (ie, match
the two sperm samples of the man, and match the hair and DNA sample of the woman). But
something unexpected happened: Three of the labs reported that the DNA from the suspect
matched the victim's DNA! Obviously, they had mixed up the samples. Only fourteen labs tested
the hair, but out of those, one screwed it up by declaring a match to the "suspect."
These kind of switches don't happen only during artificial situations designed to gauge a lab's
accuracy (which are usually performed under ideal conditions). During a 1995 rape trial, a lab
reversed the labels on the DNA samples from the victim and the defendant. Their testing then
revealed a match between the defendant's alleged DNA (which was actually the victim's) and the
DNA on the vaginal swab, which didn't contain any semen from the rapist. Luckily, this
boneheaded move was caught during the trial, but not everyone is so lucky.
The Journal of Forensic Science has reported an error that was discovered only after an innocent
man had been convicted of raping an 11-year-old girl and sentenced to prison, where lie was
undoubtedly brutalized in ways that would give you nightmares for the rest of your life, were
you to hear them described in detail. After four years, he was released because the lab hadn't
completely separated the real rapist's DNA (extracted from his semen) from the victim's DNA.
When the two were swirled together, they somehow matched that of the poor bastard whose
eleven alibi witnesses failed to sway the jury. But when the semen DNA was checked properly, it
was beyond doubt that a match didn't exist.
While most false matches are the result of human error, other factors do come into play. Some
testing techniques are more definitive than others. In the case of one innocent man — Josiah
Sutton, found guilty of rape based primarily on DNA evidence — criminology professor William
C. Thompson said: "If police picked any two black men off the street, the chances that one of
them would have a DNA profile that 'matched' the semen sample as well as Sutton's profile is
better than one in eight." Also, we mustn't forget about corruption. In some known cases, DNA
analysts have misrepresented (ie, lied about) their findings in order to obtain convictions.
For Low-Risk People, a Positive Result from an HIV Test Is Wrong Half the Time
Although a lot of progress has been made in improving the length and quality of life for people
with AIDS, getting a positive result from an HIV test must still rank as one of the worst pieces of
news a person can get. It's not uncommon for people to kill themselves right after hearing the
results, and those who don't commit suicide surely go through all kinds of mental anguish. But
the accuracy of these tests is lower than generally believed. In fact, if you test positive but you're
not a member of a high-risk group (such as non-monogamous gay men and intravenous drug
users), the odds are 50-50 that you actually have the virus.
To be declared HIV-positive, your blood goes through three tests — two ELISA tests and one
more sensitive and costly Western Blot test. Makers of the tests trumpet a 99.99 percent accuracy
rate when all three are used. Many AIDS counselors even tell people that the tests never give a
false positive (that is, the tests don't indicate that someone is HIV-positive when he or she really
isn't). The test manufacturers' claim is misleading, and the counselors' claim is flat-out BS.
Cognitive scientist Gerd Gigerenzer — who specializes in risk and uncertainty — explains the
reality in plain English:
Imagine 10,000 men who are not in any known risk category. One is infected (base rate)
and will test positive with practical certainty (sensitivity). Of the 9,999 men who are not
infected, another one will also test positive (false positive rate). So we can expect that two
men will test positive.
Out of these two men, only one actually carries the virus. So, if you're a low-risk man who tests
positive, the chances are even — the same as a coin flip — that the result is right. It's highly
advisable that you take the tests again (and again). The results are even less reliable for women
in low-risk groups, since they have a still lower rate of HIV.
Of course, this doesn't apply to an HIV-negative result. If you test negative, the odds are
overwhelmingly good (9,998 out of 9,999) that this is correct. It also doesn't hold for people in
high-risk categories. For example, if we accept the estimate that 1.5 percent of gay men are HIV-
positive, this means that out of every 10,000, an average of 150 are infected. An HIV test will
almost surely pick up on all 150, and out of the remaining 9,850 uninfected men, one will
incorrectly be labeled positive. This means that only one out of 151 gay men will be falsely
diagnosed as having HIV A false positive is thus still possible but much more unlikely.
with AIDS, getting a positive result from an HIV test must still rank as one of the worst pieces of
news a person can get. It's not uncommon for people to kill themselves right after hearing the
results, and those who don't commit suicide surely go through all kinds of mental anguish. But
the accuracy of these tests is lower than generally believed. In fact, if you test positive but you're
not a member of a high-risk group (such as non-monogamous gay men and intravenous drug
users), the odds are 50-50 that you actually have the virus.
To be declared HIV-positive, your blood goes through three tests — two ELISA tests and one
more sensitive and costly Western Blot test. Makers of the tests trumpet a 99.99 percent accuracy
rate when all three are used. Many AIDS counselors even tell people that the tests never give a
false positive (that is, the tests don't indicate that someone is HIV-positive when he or she really
isn't). The test manufacturers' claim is misleading, and the counselors' claim is flat-out BS.
Cognitive scientist Gerd Gigerenzer — who specializes in risk and uncertainty — explains the
reality in plain English:
Imagine 10,000 men who are not in any known risk category. One is infected (base rate)
and will test positive with practical certainty (sensitivity). Of the 9,999 men who are not
infected, another one will also test positive (false positive rate). So we can expect that two
men will test positive.
Out of these two men, only one actually carries the virus. So, if you're a low-risk man who tests
positive, the chances are even — the same as a coin flip — that the result is right. It's highly
advisable that you take the tests again (and again). The results are even less reliable for women
in low-risk groups, since they have a still lower rate of HIV.
Of course, this doesn't apply to an HIV-negative result. If you test negative, the odds are
overwhelmingly good (9,998 out of 9,999) that this is correct. It also doesn't hold for people in
high-risk categories. For example, if we accept the estimate that 1.5 percent of gay men are HIV-
positive, this means that out of every 10,000, an average of 150 are infected. An HIV test will
almost surely pick up on all 150, and out of the remaining 9,850 uninfected men, one will
incorrectly be labeled positive. This means that only one out of 151 gay men will be falsely
diagnosed as having HIV A false positive is thus still possible but much more unlikely.
The Suicide Rate Is Highest Among the Elderly
If you judge by the media and the public education programs, you might be inclined to think that
teenagers and young adults (aged 15 to 24) are the age group most likely to kill themselves.
Actually, they have the second-lowest rate of suicide. (The absolute lowest rate is among kids
aged 5 to 14; children younger than that are apparently deemed incapable of consciously
choosing to end their lives.) It is the elderly, by far, who have the highest rate of suicide.
In the US, of every 100,000 people aged 75 to 79, 16.5 kill themselves. For those 80 and over,
the rate is 19.43. This compares to a rate of 8.15 per 100,000 for people between the ages 15 and
19, and 12.84 for people aged 20 to 24.
As with every age group, men are far more likely to kill themselves, but among the elderly this
trend reaches extreme proportions. Of people 65 and older, men comprise a staggering 84
percent of suicides.
Because men commit the vast majority of hara-kiri among old people, looking at these male
suicide rates makes for extremely depressing reading. For guys aged 75 to 79, the suicide rate is
34.26 per 100,000. In the 80 to 84 group, men's suicide rate is 44.12. When you look at men 85
and older, the suicide rate is a heart-breaking 54.52. Compare this to the suicide rate for dudes in
their mid to late teens: 13.22 per 100,000.
It is true that suicide ranks as the second or third most common cause of death in young people
(depending on age group), while it is number 15 and under for various groups of the elderly.
Still, the suicide rate among the young is equal to their proportion of the population, while the
elderly are way overrepresented as a group. And old people are cut down by a great many
diseases and disorders virtually unknown to the young, which naturally pushes suicide down in
the rankings.
The reasons why this suicide epidemic is ignored are highly speculative and would be too
lengthy to get into here. However, we can rule out one seemingly likely explanation — suicide
among the aged is invisible because they usually O.D. on prescription drugs or kill themselves in
other ways that could easily be mistaken for natural death in someone of advanced years. This
doesn't wash, primarily because guns are the most common method of dispatch. Of suicides over
65, men used a gun 79.5 percent of the time, while women shot themselves 37 percent of the
time. It's hard to mistake that for natural causes.
The sky-high suicide rate among the elderly applies to the entire world, not just the US. Plotted
in a graph, suicide rates by age group around the globe gently curve upward as age increases.
When the graph reaches the final age group, the line suddenly spikes, especially for men.
Worldwide, men 75 and over have a suicide rate of 55.7 per 100,000, while women in the same
age group have a rate of 18.8. This rate for old men is almost three times the global rate for guys
aged 15 to 24, while the rate for old women is well over three times the rate for young gals in
that age group.
teenagers and young adults (aged 15 to 24) are the age group most likely to kill themselves.
Actually, they have the second-lowest rate of suicide. (The absolute lowest rate is among kids
aged 5 to 14; children younger than that are apparently deemed incapable of consciously
choosing to end their lives.) It is the elderly, by far, who have the highest rate of suicide.
In the US, of every 100,000 people aged 75 to 79, 16.5 kill themselves. For those 80 and over,
the rate is 19.43. This compares to a rate of 8.15 per 100,000 for people between the ages 15 and
19, and 12.84 for people aged 20 to 24.
As with every age group, men are far more likely to kill themselves, but among the elderly this
trend reaches extreme proportions. Of people 65 and older, men comprise a staggering 84
percent of suicides.
Because men commit the vast majority of hara-kiri among old people, looking at these male
suicide rates makes for extremely depressing reading. For guys aged 75 to 79, the suicide rate is
34.26 per 100,000. In the 80 to 84 group, men's suicide rate is 44.12. When you look at men 85
and older, the suicide rate is a heart-breaking 54.52. Compare this to the suicide rate for dudes in
their mid to late teens: 13.22 per 100,000.
It is true that suicide ranks as the second or third most common cause of death in young people
(depending on age group), while it is number 15 and under for various groups of the elderly.
Still, the suicide rate among the young is equal to their proportion of the population, while the
elderly are way overrepresented as a group. And old people are cut down by a great many
diseases and disorders virtually unknown to the young, which naturally pushes suicide down in
the rankings.
The reasons why this suicide epidemic is ignored are highly speculative and would be too
lengthy to get into here. However, we can rule out one seemingly likely explanation — suicide
among the aged is invisible because they usually O.D. on prescription drugs or kill themselves in
other ways that could easily be mistaken for natural death in someone of advanced years. This
doesn't wash, primarily because guns are the most common method of dispatch. Of suicides over
65, men used a gun 79.5 percent of the time, while women shot themselves 37 percent of the
time. It's hard to mistake that for natural causes.
The sky-high suicide rate among the elderly applies to the entire world, not just the US. Plotted
in a graph, suicide rates by age group around the globe gently curve upward as age increases.
When the graph reaches the final age group, the line suddenly spikes, especially for men.
Worldwide, men 75 and over have a suicide rate of 55.7 per 100,000, while women in the same
age group have a rate of 18.8. This rate for old men is almost three times the global rate for guys
aged 15 to 24, while the rate for old women is well over three times the rate for young gals in
that age group.
Work Kills More People Than War
The United Nations' International Labor Organization has revealed some horrifying stats:
The ILO estimates that approximately two million workers lose their lives annually due to
occupational injuries and illnesses, with accidents causing at least 350,000 deaths a year.
For every fatal accident, there are an estimated 1,000 non-fatal injuries, many of which
result in lost earnings, permanent disability and poverty. The death toll at work, much of
which is attributable to unsafe working practices, is the equivalent of 5,000 workers dying
each day, three persons every minute.
This is more than double the figure for deaths from warfare (650,000 death* per year).
According to the ILO's SafeWork programme, work kills more people than alcohol and
drugs together and the resulting loss in Gross Domestic Product is 20 times greater than all
official development assistance to the developing countries.
Each year, 6,570 US workers die because of injuries at work, while 60,225 meet their maker due
to occupational diseases. (Meanwhile, 13.2 million get hurt, and 1.1 million develop illnesses
that don't kill them.) On an average day, two or three workers are fatally shot, two fall to their
deaths, one is killed after being smashed by a vehicle, and one is electrocuted. Each year, around
30 workers die of heat stroke, and another 30 expire from carbon monoxide.
Although blue collar workers face a lot of the most obvious dangers, those slaving in offices or
stores must contend with toxic air, workplace violence, driving accidents, and (especially for the
health-care workers) transmissible diseases. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
warns that poisonous indoor air in nonindustrial workplaces causes "[t]housands of heart disease
deaths [and] hundreds of lung cancer deaths" each year.
But hey, everybody has to go sometime, right? And since we spend so much of our lives in the
workplace, it's only logical that a lot of deaths happen — or at least are set into motion — on the
job. This explanation certainly is true to an extent, but it doesn't excuse all such deaths. The
International Labor Organization says that half of workplace fatalities are avoidable. In A Job to
Die For, Lisa Cullen writes:
In the workplace, few real accidents occur because the surroundings and operations are
known; therefore, hazards can be identified. When harm from those hazards can be
foreseen, accidents can be prevented....
Most jobs have expected, known hazards. Working in and near excavations, for example,
poses the obvious risks of death or injury from cave-in.... When trenches or excavations
collapse because soil was piled right up to the edge, there is little room to claim it was an
accident.
The ILO estimates that approximately two million workers lose their lives annually due to
occupational injuries and illnesses, with accidents causing at least 350,000 deaths a year.
For every fatal accident, there are an estimated 1,000 non-fatal injuries, many of which
result in lost earnings, permanent disability and poverty. The death toll at work, much of
which is attributable to unsafe working practices, is the equivalent of 5,000 workers dying
each day, three persons every minute.
This is more than double the figure for deaths from warfare (650,000 death* per year).
According to the ILO's SafeWork programme, work kills more people than alcohol and
drugs together and the resulting loss in Gross Domestic Product is 20 times greater than all
official development assistance to the developing countries.
Each year, 6,570 US workers die because of injuries at work, while 60,225 meet their maker due
to occupational diseases. (Meanwhile, 13.2 million get hurt, and 1.1 million develop illnesses
that don't kill them.) On an average day, two or three workers are fatally shot, two fall to their
deaths, one is killed after being smashed by a vehicle, and one is electrocuted. Each year, around
30 workers die of heat stroke, and another 30 expire from carbon monoxide.
Although blue collar workers face a lot of the most obvious dangers, those slaving in offices or
stores must contend with toxic air, workplace violence, driving accidents, and (especially for the
health-care workers) transmissible diseases. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
warns that poisonous indoor air in nonindustrial workplaces causes "[t]housands of heart disease
deaths [and] hundreds of lung cancer deaths" each year.
But hey, everybody has to go sometime, right? And since we spend so much of our lives in the
workplace, it's only logical that a lot of deaths happen — or at least are set into motion — on the
job. This explanation certainly is true to an extent, but it doesn't excuse all such deaths. The
International Labor Organization says that half of workplace fatalities are avoidable. In A Job to
Die For, Lisa Cullen writes:
In the workplace, few real accidents occur because the surroundings and operations are
known; therefore, hazards can be identified. When harm from those hazards can be
foreseen, accidents can be prevented....
Most jobs have expected, known hazards. Working in and near excavations, for example,
poses the obvious risks of death or injury from cave-in.... When trenches or excavations
collapse because soil was piled right up to the edge, there is little room to claim it was an
accident.
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